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Constitutional Limitations on
Governmental Participation in
Downtown Development Projects
David M. Lawrence*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The decline and decay of the downtown areas of American cities is well known and widespread. Over the years, inner city residents have moved to the suburbs and have been followed by
downtown retailers who have relocated their businesses in suburban shopping malls. Changing industrial technology has caused
factories to move from inner city lofts to single-level suburban
sites, and modern communications systems have permitted company headquarters and professional firms to locate away from the
downtown area. Throughout this process, central city governments
have sought to halt and reverse the trend and to return the downtown areas to their former vitality. Initially local governments tried
to encourage private investors to participate in downtown development projects by improving the downtown area's public infrastructure.1 Under this approach, the government would improve and
widen downtown streets and sidewalks, provide alternate traffic
routes, and open new shopping malls and parking garages with the
expectation that private investors would develop the particular
area even further.
A second approach that city governments have employed is to
encourage downtown development in the private sector by reduc* Professor of Public Law and Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. A.B., 1965, Princeton University; J.D., 1968, Harvard University.
1. Green, The City's Role in CBD Revitalization, in GumDNS FOR BUSINESS LaIDERS AND CrrY OFFICIA.LS TO A NEW CBD 131 (R. Mace ed. 1961).
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ing the burdens of taxation and regulation on the participants in
downtown development projects.2 For example, a new private developer might receive a complete or partial abatement of property
taxes for several years or, in exchange for promising to provide various public amenities such as a plaza at ground level, be placed in
a special zoning classification that permits the construction of a
taller building.
Because infrastructure improvement and tax and zoning incentives attempt only to encourage development generally, some
local governments recently have begun to use a third approach,
which envisions promoting specific development projects - especially projects thai might trigger further private development.$
These ventures require active cooperation between the public and
private sectors, with each sector responsible for specific components of the entire project. For example, a single project might include a large parking facility with a convention center, a hotel, and
one or more retail or office structures located in the air space above
the facility. In such a project, the city might acquire the land and
construct the parking garage and convention center, and the private developer might lease the air space from the city and construct the other buildings. The city would build the parking facility as a part of this particular project, rather than as part of a
program to improve the general downtown infrastructure. The Urban Development Action Grant program,4 which provides federal
financial support to job-creating economic development projects,
has encouraged this approach by giving funding preference to
projects in which both the public and private sectors of the community participate.5
A continuing concern for attorneys who advise public participants in these public/private projects has been the extent to which
a city constitutionally may participate in a downtown development
scheme. Most state constitutions contain one or more limitations
2. For a discussion on tax incentives, see URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 161-68 (1980). For a discussion on incentive zoning, see 2 R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (SECOND)

§

9.23 (1976).

3. Recent literature has discussed the emerging use of this third approach of a public/
private partnership. See, e.g., URBAN LAND INSTrrUTE, supra note 2; Madonna, Public/Private Partnershipfor Downtown Development, URB. LAND, Feb. 1980, at 12.
4. The statutory authority for the Urban Development Action Grant program is codi-

fied at 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (Supp. III 1979 & West Supp. 1981).
5. 24 C.F.R. § 570.458 (1981); Cordish, Overview of UDAG, in
MENT

ACTION

GRANT PROGRAM

THE URBAN DEVELOP-

7 (R. Nathan & J. Webman eds. 1980).
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on public assistance to private enterprise,6 which were enacted in
the aftermath of the painful lessons that were learned from the
pervasive public assistance to railroads in the nineteenth century."
These express constitutional provisions, together with the comparable case law doctrines of public use and public purpose,8 clearly
prohibit some-though not all-forms of public participation in
downtown development projects. The purpose of this Article is to
investigate the constitutional boundaries that surround the most
common forms of governmental participation.
Part II of the Article discusses the constitutional limitations
on property transactions in which the government either uses its
power of eminent domain to condemn land for private downtown
development, acquires land for the same purpose through a voluntary sale by the owner of the land, or subsidizes private development by its method of conveying property to the developer. Part
III of the Article then discusses the problems that arise when a
downtown project includes both public and private facilities, and
the public facilities arguably benefit the private facilities far more
than they do the general public. Finally, the Article concludes by
briefly summarizing the actual or probable resolution of the major
legal issues in each of the topic areas.
II. PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
A local government often will acquire land for downtown development and subsequently will sell or lease that land to a private
developer. These types of property transactions might benefit a developer in several ways, some or all of which might be present in a
6. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 10; MINN. CONST. art. 11, § 2; N.M. CONST. art. IX, §
14; OR. CONST. art. XI §§ 7, 9.
7. For an excellent discussion of these limitations, see Pinsky, State Constitutional
Limitations on PublicIndustrialFinancing:An Historicaland Economic Approach, 111 U.
PA. L. REv. 265 (1963).
8. The doctrine of public use is a limitation on the power of eminent domain. The
state courts uniformly hold that public and private agencies which enjoy the power of eminent domain may take property for public uses only. The limitation usually is not set out
explicitly in state constitutions, but rather has been created by judicial decision. The courts
are not as uniform in determining what constitutes a public use, however. See 2A P. NICHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 7 (J. Sackman 3d ed. 1980), for an extended discussion of the doctrine.
The doctrine of public purpose, on the other hand, limits governmental expenditure. If
an activity is not for a public purpose, the government may not expend public funds on it.
As with the doctrine of public use, the public purpose limitation is uniformly accepted but
differently applied by the states and usually is created by judicial decision rather than express constitutional provision. See 2 C. AmNxsAu, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 15A.06-.23
(1979), for an exhaustive discussion of the doctrine.
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particular instance. Through the use of its eminent domain power,9
for example, a government can facilitate-or render possible-the
assembly of land currently divided into a number of small separately held lots. Moreover, by writing-down e the cost of acquiring
and clearing the land, a government can provide cleared land at a
cost that is well below what it would have cost the developer to
purchase and clear it; this procedure in turn reduces the developer's equity and increases the return on his investment. In addition, through simply buying the land and selling it at cost - perhaps in staged installments-or leasing it to a developer, a
government might enable the developer to resolve cash flow
problems or reduce equity requirements. This part of the Article,
therefore, discusses the constitutionality of the following governmental activities: The use of eminent domain to purchase land for
private downtown development;" the voluntary purchase of land
for the same purpose;12 and the government's use of subsidized
conveyances' s to encourage
private participation in downtown de14
velopment projects.

A. Acquisition by Eminent Domain
A local government's exercise of its power of eminent domain
9. Eminent domain-or condemnation-is, of course, the power of the sovereign or its
agent to take private property for public use without the owner's consent. Both the federal
and the various state constitutions require that the condemnor pay just compensation to the
former owner of the property. See 2A P. NicHOLS, supra note 8, at ch. 1, for a basic discussion of the power of eminent domain.
The power of eminent domain frequently is contrasted to the police power. The latter is
the power to regulate property (and persons), and no compensation is required. The line
between the two sovereign powers is often dim, and a lively literature has developed that
attempts to delineate it. See, e.g., Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81
YALE L.J. 149 (1971).

10. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 15-82 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
14. Another form of government assistance is the sale or lease of land that the government already owns, but which it does not need for corporate purposes-that is, surplus land.
If this land is conveyed at market value, constitutional issues usually do not surface. 10 E.
McQUMLIN, THE LAw OF MUNICnAL CORPORATIONS § 28.38a (3d ed. rev. 1981). If the land
was acquired by dedication, however, the government may not be free to dispose of it, even
if the land is no longer needed for the dedicated purpose. 11 id. § 33.76. Sales of surplus
land often are required by statute to be made by competitive methods, 10 id. § 28.45, and
such a requirement may create inconveniences in the downtown development context. Statutory problems, however, are relatively easy to cure.
One special form of surplus property-rights to air space over public facilities-is discussed in more detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 152-56.
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to acquire property for subsequent resale to a private developer
raises the constitutional question whether this use of the government's condemnation power is indeed a public one. The raising of
this issue, of course, assumes that the public use requirement remains a viable limitation on the power of eminent domain; this
assumption, however, is not universally accepted. 5 Nevertheless,
in one set of circumstances the requirement does seem to have retained some vitality. This situation occurs when the government
arguably is condemning one private party's property for the purpose of conveying that property to another private party,s which
is one way that a government's actions in a downtown development
condemnation can be characterized. Therefore, because the public
use requirement retains its vitality when such a characterization is
possible, the public use requirement for a government's exercise of
its eminent domain power is assumed to be a viable limitation on
that power.
The discussion below considers three possible bases for a government's use of its eminent domain power to support a downtown
development project. The first justification stems from cases that
have approved various forms of governmental assistance to industrial development. The second relies on decisions that have upheld
local participation in the federally funded urban renewal program.
The final justification maintains that downtown development, in
and of itself, constitutes a public use.
1.

The Industrial Development Cases

In the last thirty years state and local governments have developed a variety of programs either to encourage or to subsidize
industrial development. These programs include industrial development bonds, industrial development loans and loan guarantees,
loan repayment subsidies, and the actual contribution of equity
capital.1 7 Not surprisingly-considering bond counsel's need for
certainty about whether the government's purpose in issuing the
15. See, e.g., Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance
Requiem, 58 YAL, L.J. 599 (1949).
16. See, e.g., Rudee Inlet Auth. v. Bastian, 206 Va. 906, 147 S.E.2d 131 (1966). The
court in Bastianheld that since the Authority's enabling legislation permitted it to sell or
lease property which it had acquired through condemnation without placing in the deed
restrictions on its use, any governmental attempt to condemn land under that legislation
would be for a private use and would thus be invalid.
17. For a discussion of the range of these programs, see L. LrrvAK & B. DANIELS, INNOVATIONS IN DzvELopMENT FINANcE (1979).
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bond is constitutionally permissible-the litigation challenging
these programs has tended to focus on the constitutionality of industrial development revenue bonds.18 Most courts have validated
programs that utilize these bonds, notwithstanding arguments that
the bonds unconstitutionally "loan" the public credit, that the
public is making an unconstitutional donation to a private party,
and that the programs do not serve a public purpose.1 9 In upholding these programs courts often speak broadly about the appropriateness of government support of economic development. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, for example, using language that courts
in subsequent industrial development bond cases have quoted frequently, stated that
[t]he consensus of modern legislative and judicial thinking is to broaden the
scope of activities which may be classed as involving a public purpose ....
It
reaches perhaps its broadest extent under the view that economic welfare is
one of the main concerns of the city, state and the federal governments."

The Kentucky court then analogized economic development programs, which provide jobs and thereby reduce poverty, to welfare
programs, which also reduce the burdens of unemployment and
poverty.2"
The above mentioned cases uphold a variety of spending programs that allow direct governmental assistance to private concerns for the purpose of encouraging economic development.
Downtown development may be' viewed as one form of economic
development, since it clearly provides jobs and increases the particular locality's tax base. Nevertheless, the economic development
cases do not provide strong support for a local government's use of
eminent domain to support downtown development. Simply because a government constitutionally may exercise its spending
power to foster economic development does not automatically authorize that government to use its power of eminent domain to
reach the same end. Although some authority exists for the proposition that once a particular goal is accepted as a legitimate one
18. In order to be marketable, municipal bonds must be accompanied by an opinion of
bond counsel stating that the bonds are valid obligations of the issuing unit and that the

interest on the bonds is exempt from federal income tax. For an explanation of how industrial development revenue bonds function, see infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.

19. See Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d
745 (1968). The court in Mitchell made a comprehensive survey of the case law on this issue
through 1967. For a more recent, supplemental list, see City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 287
Minn. 357, 178 N.W.2d 594 (1970).
20. Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 472, 232 S.W.2d 80, 83 (1950).
21. Id.
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for governmental action, the government may use any of its basic
powers-taxing, spending, regulating, and condemning-to reach
that goal, 2 at least one commentator has propounded the opposite-and better reasoned-viewpoint.2 3 Under state law, both the
police power 24 and the taxing power 5 are broader than the spending power. For example, a city might require by ordinance that all
owners of private residential swimming pools fence in their pools;' 6
if, however, the city chose to grant money outright to those owners,
the city's actions probably would not survive a public purpose
challenge. Similarly, the universal property tax exemption for
church properties does not support cash grants to churches, 27 and
state income tax deductions for mortgage interest do not support
comparable grants to all homeowners.' 8
The power of eminent domain, as limited by the doctrine of
public use, is even more narrow than the spending power, which is
limited by the doctrine of public purpose.'. A county, for example,
clearly serves a public purpose by operating a library and, presumably, by purchasing a rare literary work such as a Gutenberg Bible
to be included in that library. In contrast, a court probably would
not allow the county to acquire the Bible forcibly from an owner
who happened to live within the county's jurisdiction. Condemnation of property for a public project clearly affects the owners of
that property much more directly than the levy of a tax for the
project affects the average taxpayer. One commentator, however,
has suggested that the compensation requirement counterbalances
22. See New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936);
Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553 (1972).
23. See 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 8, § 7.225[3].
24. "The police power is an inherent power of the sovereign states which was possessed by them before the adoption of the United States Constitution and which has been
reserved to them under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." C.
RtYNE, THE LAW OF LocAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 19.1, at 447 (1980).
25. "[T]he power to tax is considered a right inherent in the state and an attribute of
sovereignty." Id. § 28.1, at 952. The taxing power is used both to raise revenues and to
pursue nonrevenue purposes through tax legislation. See generally id. § 28.15, at 980.
26. See, e.g., Palangio v. City of Chicago, 23 IMI.2d 570, 179 N.E.2d 663 (1962).
27. The Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), upheld church
property tax exemptions.
28. Courts have upheld state and local subsidies of middle-income housing either as a

support to low-income housing or because of private market failures. See, e.g.,
Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 297 Minn. 155, 210 N.W.2d 298 (1973); Infants
Hous. Dev. Auth., 221 Va. 659, 272 S.E.2d 649 (1980). These cases, however,
support the subsidization of all homeowners-i.e., upper-income owners as well
and lower-income owners.
29. See supra note 8.

Minnesota
v. Virginia
would not
as middle-
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the direct impact of condemnation on the property owner.3 0 This
proposition is questionable at best. A property owner who forces a
government to exercise its eminent domain power to acquire his
property might do so for one or more of several reasons, but more
often than not one principal reason is that he simply does not want
to sell at all-or at least not at a price that is even remotely
equivalent to the "market" price. The homeowner might have a
sentimental attachment to his home or neighborhood, or he might
not want to undergo the burdens of moving. These personal values
are noncompensable, and, therefore, the compensation requirement does not counterbalance completely the direct and narrow
impact of a condemnation. In fact, a condemnation could leave the
condemnee less well off than he was before the taking, even if he
does not have a special personal attachment to the property. A
small businessman whose store is condemned, for example, might
lose the local clientele that he has built up over many years. If he
is unable to relocate in the same neighborhood, or if the neighborhood itself has been dispersed, the businessman may lose a sizable
portion of his patronage even though the value of his goodwill is
noncompensable3 1 These points suggest that courts should not validate a particular application of eminent domain solely because
other decisions have held spending programs seeking the same end
to be constitutional on the ground that they serve a public
purpose.32
This proposition is particularly true in cases that uphold industrial development revenue bonds. The proceeds of such a bond
issue typically are used to construct an industrial facility according
to the specifications of a particular business enterprise. The bond
issuer-a state or local government-then contracts with the enterprise to enable the latter to occupy the industrial facility during
the period in which the bonds remain outstanding. Under the contract, the enterprise's payments are fixed to meet debt service on
the bonds plus any other expenses of the issuing agency that are
related to the transaction. Once the bonds are retired, the facility
30.
31.
32.

Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 596.
2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 8, § 5.76.
See Shizas v. City of Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589 (1952). Shizas suggests

judicial support for the distinction that is drawn in the text. The court in Shizas held the
government's condemnation of land for a parking garage to be invalid because some of the
space would be leased to private, commercial tenants. The court distinguished a similar New

York case in part on the ground that in the New York case the public agency already owned
the land, and, therefore, condemnation was not an issue.
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is conveyed to the enterprise for a nominal sum. Because the only
security for the bonds is the issuer's contract with the enterprise,
the bonds are sold on the credit of the enterprise, not the issuing
government. The chief reason for the government's involvement, of
course, is that the interest on the bonds is exempt from federal
income tax if a state or local government is the issuer.3
With industrial development revenue bonds, then, neither the
revenues nor the credit of the issuing government is actually risked
in aiding industrial development.3 4 This fact certainly must have
influenced the attitudes of those state courts that have ruled on
the constitutionality of state and local government bond programs.
As one Pennsylvania judge noted, "Fundamentally, [industrial development revenue bond] programs involve no more than the creation of an atmosphere conducive to industrial and economic
growth by providing the mechanism for the realization of permissible tax benefits. No public property is devoted, nor credit lent to
the industrial lessee." 85 If industrial development bonds had been
general obligations on the government, or if the government's role
in these schemes was otherwise more active, it is unlikely that the
courts would have taken such a relaxed view of the permissible
range of governmental activities. Indeed, some of the decisions that
have invalidated these bond programs indicate that the courts may
not have fully understood the reason for the government's issuance
of the bonds.3 6
Both courts and legislatures have indicated their belief that
judicial approval of industrial development revenue bond programs
does not provide persuasive authority for the constitutionality of
invoking eminent domain powers for the purpose of industrial development. Most industrial development revenue bond statutes do
33.

I.R.C. § 103(c) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).

34. In a few instances governments have issued, and courts have approved, general
obligation issues for industrial projects. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Palmer, 468 P.2d 326
(Alaska 1970).
35. Basehore v. Hampden Indus. Dev.Auth., 433 Pa. 40, 67, 248 A.2d 212, 225 (1968)

(Roberts, J., concurring).
36. See, e.g., Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho 337, 345, 353 P.2d
767, 772 (1960) ("It is obvious that one of the prime purposes of having the necessary bonds
issued by and in the name of a municipality is to make them more readily salable on the
market."); State v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 227, 82 N.W.2d 269, 272 (1957):
If evidences of indebtedness by interested private persons are inadequate and revenue
bonds of the city are sufficient, either the credit of the city has been extended or their
purchasers are victims of a base delusion.... The use of the city as the payer of the
bonds is intended to give respectability to them because of the general acceptability of
cities as a source of bond issues in financial markets.
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not grant eminent domain authority to the agencies issuing the
bonds,37 and some even expressly deny this authority.3 8 In addition, a majority of the courts which have confronted the issue directly have held that condemnation for economic development
alone-for example, for a factory site or an industrial park - does
not meet the public use requirement and, therefore, is

unconstitutional. 9
In sum, the case law upholding various industrial development
assistance programs should not automatically be extended to permit governmental assistance in the form of eminent domain. Furthermore, the underlying rationales for approval of these existing
assistance programs do not support condemnations for the same

purpose, particularly in the downtown area. Perhaps the two most
common rationales that are used to justify industrial development
assistance programs are the creation of jobs-especially in times or
areas of high unemployment-and the diversification of the com-

munity's economic base, both of which are said to help cushion the
effects of economic downturns. 40 Almost all the programs that have
been tested in the courts have been industrial development programs, and several of the courts in these cases have made special
reference to the multiplier effect of industrial jobs,41 an effect that

is not inherent in retail or other commercial employment. Most
downtown developments that create jobs create commercial
jobs-for example, in hotels, office buildings, or retail establishments-and the public benefit of manufacturing jobs is rarely present. Other downtown development projects provide housing, and
37. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1151 to -1196 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 4057-01 to -20 (1968 & Supp. 1981).
38. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, 1 850.07, § 7(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 419.14 (West 1976). In the usual case the private company owns the land
initially, and, therefore, eminent domain is unnecessary.
39. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967); City
of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1979); Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440,
131 A.2d 904 (1957); Opinion to the Governor, 79 R.I. 305, 88 A.2d 167 (1952) (dicta); Hogue
v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959). Contra Prince George's County v.
Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278 (1975); Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
40. See DeArmond v. Alaska State Dev. Corp., 376 P.2d 717 (Alaska 1962); Roan v.
Connecticut Indus. Bldg. Comm'n, 150 Conn. 333, 189 A.2d 399 (1963).
41. See, e.g., City of Gaylord v. Gaylord City Clerk, 378 Mich. 273, 144 N.W.2d 460
(1966); City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 287 Minn. 357, 178 N.W.2d 594 (1970); State v. La
Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973). Although manufacturing plants typically produce goods that are sold outside the region, part of the resulting income is spent within the
region and creates further jobs. This phenomenon is known as the multiplier effect of industrial jobs. See W. HIRsCH, URBAN ECONoMIc ANALYSis 186-94 (1973).
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housing projects create very few permanent jobs of any sort. Thus,
the multiplier effect rationale that supports governmental assistance to industrial development loses much of its force when governments use it to justify downtown development."
The diversification rationale also fails to provide support for
invoking eminent domain to assist downtown development
projects. In the industrial development context, a community that
is seeking to diversify is trying to lessen its dependence on one or a
few plants or industries. The community, therefore, would be justified in attempting to attract new manufacturers to the area. For
the diversification analogy to be viable in the downtown development context, the local government would have to be seeking to
bring categories of businesses to its downtown area that did not
then exist in the entire region-not merely in the downtown area.
A local economy is area-wide, not downtown-wide, and a community would enjoy the benefits of diversity from the opening of new
businesses anywhere in its metropolitan region. Downtown development, however, does not necessarily attract new development to
the region; it may direct development toward the downtown area
as opposed to the suburbs. The hotel, the office space, and the retailing space could be constructed anywhere in the metropolitan
area. Consequently, downtown development usually does not further the goal of metropolitan economic diversification.
Thus, the industrial development cases do not support the use
of eminent domain for downtown development projects. As noted
above, the major rationales that governments use to justify exercising their other basic constitutional powers to encourage or assist
industrial development simply do not provide sufficient justification for the exercise of eminent domain powers to subsidize downtown development. A second doctrinal base, however-urban renewal-provides a more promising justification for a government's
use of this power.
42. Quite recently, a few courts have upheld the constitutionality of industrial revenue
bonds for commercial purposes. See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Village of South Barrington, 92 Ill. App. 3d 360, 415 N.E.2d 1277 (1981); State ex rel. Ohio County Comm'n v.
Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2 (W. Va. 1980). The court in Samol expressly stated that it could see no
distinction between industrial and commercial projects. Id. at 4. The South Carolina Supreme Court, on the other hand, held a government's authorization to use these bonds for
computer and office facilities and shopping centers to be unconstitutional. State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley, 278 S.E.2d 612 (S.C. 1981). The court expressly noted that commercial
projects do not provide very many new jobs.
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2. The Urban Renewal Cases
Congress initiated the federal urban renewal program with the
Housing Act of 1949. 4 s Although a number of amendments to the
program were enacted during its existence, the original plan, which
continued throughout the life of urban renewal, envisioned an initial acquisition of land by a local redevelopment agency-by eminent domain if necessary-followed by clearance of the land by the
agency, installation of public improvements, and sale of the land to
private developers. The proceeds from the sale typically were well
below the cost of acquisition and clearance. Under the program,
the primary role of the federal government was to finance the major share of this "net project cost."' 44 The local government's role in

urban renewal is strikingly similar to the part which local governments play in the downtown development projects that are the focus of this Article.
Under the urban renewal program, only certain property could
be acquired for a development project. The property had to be
part of either a slum or a blighted area (an area in danger of becoming a slum);45 thus, the public use that justified the condemna-

tion was slum elimination or prevention. Each of the courts that
upheld condemnation for urban renewal addressed the constitutional problems that arose because the government was condemning private property and frequently selling it to another private
user.46 In each case the court characterized the program as one

designed to eliminate existing or incipient slums and justified the
ultimate sale of the property to a private developer by stating either that the sale was incidental to this basic purpose 47 or, more
positively, that the condemnation was a crucial component of the
program and was necessary to ensure that the properties did not
43. Ch. 338, § 2, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). Under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
§ 101, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 42 U.S.C.), urban
renewal was one of the categorical programs merged into the Community Development
Block Grant program.
44. For a description of the urban renewal program, see Slayton, The Operation and
Achievements of the Urban Renewal Program, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE
CONTROVERSY

189 (J. Wilson ed. 1966).

45. 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 8,§ 7.51561 to .51561[1].
46. All but three states-Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina-have upheld the constitutionality of local participation in the urban renewal program. The Georgia decision was
nullified by constitutional amendment, and later Florida decisions seriously undercut that
state's initial decision. For a collection of these cases, see 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 8,§
7.51561 n.1.
47. See Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 96 N.W.2d 673 (1959).

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

1982]

289

revert to their former substandard condition.'8
Although the primary federal concern throughout the life of
the urban renewal program was improving the housing conditions
of the poor-either through clearance or rehabilitation of substandard dwellings or through redevelopment of the project areas with
new low-income housing-the cases that upheld local participation
in these programs were not limited to residential development
schemes. 4 9 Local governments constitutionally could condemn
property that was in a blighted area regardless of whether the area
was residential or commercial and regardless of the intended subsequent reuse of the property.8 0 Thus, if a downtown development
project is planned for an area that meets the state's statutory definition of blight, the existing statutory procedures and validating
case law arguably could support the government's acquisition of
the necessary property by eminent domain.
This proposition, of course, raises the issue of when an area for
which a downtown project is proposed will be considered blighted.
In addressing this question, one should first realize that one of several possible dominant land use patterns might characterize a particular project area.5 1 These areas typically are characterized by a
number of small two and three story buildings that are at least a
generation old. In all likelihood, most businesses, if they exist at
all, occupy these buildings as tenants rather than as owners, and
many of the owners are absentees. The variations between areas
arise from the different uses that owners or occupants make of the
buildings. The existing structures, for example, might be empty
and deteriorating, or they might be vacant but only marginally
maintained at or just above code requirements. Alternatively,
small enterprises may be operating in the area with businesses
that, although perhaps not flourishing, are at least surviving. These
businesses might be considered innocuous-for example, grocers,
printing shops, or insurance agencies. Conversely, the businesses
might be considered the precursors of blight themselves if, for example, they are operating as pawnshops or as bail bondsmen.
48.
49.

See Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954).
2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 8, § 7.51561[2]-[3].

50. Id.
51.

The condition of the individual property to be condemned is not the crucial factor

to a finding of blight; rather, the condition of the area as a whole is the determinative consideration. Thus, if the entire area is blighted, then sound buildings that house flourishing
businesses may, without question, be condemned as part of a redevelopment project. See
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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Although the statutory definitions of the terms "slum" and
"blight" are not uniform throughout the fifty states, and although
in some states they scarcely can be characterized as definitions at
all,52 one set of definitions recurs frequently enough to be considered the norm.58 The Arizona statute, which provides a relatively
typical example, defines "slum area"5 rather narrowly, but gives a
much broader definition of a "blighted area. '5 5 Arizona's definition
of slum area is largely concerned with the conditions of existing
structures, the degree of crowding in those structures, and the effects of these conditions and the crowding on the public health and
safety. Rigorously applied, the statute probably would extend at
most to the first of the land use patterns which were posited above,
namely, that of empty and deteriorating buildings. The definition
of blighted area under the Arizona statute, however, is entirely different. This definition is not concerned so much with the conditions of the buildings themselves, but with a variety of external
factors, such as poor platting, diversity of ownership, and title
problems, that could either affect the uses to which the buildings
are put or create obstacles to private redevelopment. The definition, therefore, is very broad and seems to include not only all the
52.

Connecticut, for example, defines a "redevelopment area" as "an area within the

state which is deteriorated, deteriorating, substandard or detrimental to the safety, health,
morals or welfare of the community." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-125(b) (1979).
53. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1119 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.17 (West 1976);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4801 (1978); Wvo. STAT. § 15-10-101 (1980).

54. According to the Arizona statute, a "slum area" is an area in which
a majority of the structures are residential, or an area in which there is a predominance

of buildings or improvements, whether residential or nonresidential, and which, by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescense, inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or open spaces, high density of population and overcrowding,
or the existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire or other causes, or
any combination of such factors, is conducive to ill health, transmission of disease,
infant mortality, juvenile delinquency or crime, and is detrimental to the public health,
safety, morals, or welfare.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1471(18) (1974).
55. A "blighted area" is an area
other than a slum area, which by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility or usefulness, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or other improvements,
diversity of ownership, tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value
of the land, defective or unusual conditions of title, improper subdivision or obsolete
platting, or the existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire or other
causes, or any combination of such factors, substantially impairs or arrests the sound
growth of a municipality, retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare in its present condition and use.
Id. § 36-1471(2).
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possible land use patterns described above, but also any other aging downtown area that someone might think is in need of
redevelopment.
Even though all but three states have upheld urban renewal
programs-and, consequently, something similar to the definition
of blight described above-against constitutional attacks,8 courts
have rarely been confronted with proposed actions that carry the
definition to its limit and, for example, seek to condemn property
simply because the lots are small and the ownership is diverse. The
various state legislatures wrote the urban renewal statutes to enable local governments to participate in a federal program; under
these statutory schemes, therefore, an area probably would not be
designated as blighted unless it met both federal standards and
those of the state enabling act. The federal standards, however,
were more similar to the states' statutory definition of slum than
to their definition of blight.57 These federal urban renewal standards centered on the condition and use of buildings; they made
no mention of factors such as obsolete platting, diversified ownership, and substantial tax delinquency. To qualify as a federally
funded urban renewal area, at least twenty percent of the area's
buildings had to suffer from one or more "building deficiencies." 58
In addition, the entire area had to contain at least two "environmental deficiencies," which are factors that are concerned with
overcrowding, incompatible or detrimental land uses, or deficient
public facilities.8 9 Furthermore, if the area was to be cleared rather
56.

See supra note 46.

57. See U.S.

DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK,

RHA 7205.1, ch. 1 (1968).
58. Id. at 1. The listed building deficiencies were the following:
(1) Defects to a point warranting clearance.
(2) Deteriorating condition because of a defect not correctable by normal
maintenance.
(3) Extensive minor repairs which, taken collectively, are causing the building to have
a deteriorating effect on the surrounding area.
(4) Inadequate original construction or alterations.
(5) Inadequate or unsafe plumbing, heating, or electrical facilities.
(6) Other equally significant building deficiencies.
Id. at 1-2.
59. Id. at 1. The listed environmental deficiencies were the following:
(1) Overcrowding or improper location of structures on the land.
(2) Excessive dwelling unit density.
(3) Conversions to incompatible types of uses, such as rooming houses among family
dwellings.
(4) Obsolete building types, such as large residences or other buildings which through
lack of use or maintenance have a blighting influence.
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than rehabilitated, the federal standards required that the area
meet one of two additional tests: (1) more than fifty percent of the
area's buildings had to be so structurally substandard that they
required clearance; or (2) more than twenty percent of the buildings had to meet the first test and an additional number-at least
thirty percent-had to be removed to eliminate "blighting influences" that were very much like environmental deficiencies.eo
Thus, the federal requirements made it unlikely that a court would
have occasion to discuss the more questionable elements of the
blighted area definition; consequently, using the urban renewal
cases as authority for the appropriateness of exercising eminent
domain in areas that meet only this broad definition is
questionable.
Indeed, a few of the courts that have upheld the urban renewal process against constitutional attack-in cases in which the
area concerned clearly was a slum-expressed their concern about
the government's use of eminent domain under the broad blighted
area definition. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, for example,
after upholding the constitutionality of slum clearance, noted that
"[s]everal of the conditions [in the blighted area definition] do not
in our view touch upon a public use. Examples are found in 'faulty
lot layout,' 'deterioration of site,' 'diversity of ownership,' 'defective or unusual conditions of title,' 'improper subdivisions or obsolete platting,' or 'mixture of incompatible uses.' "81 Similarly, the
Delaware Supreme Court indicated that it had the "very gravest
doubt" about the constitutionality of eminent domain in an area
that met only the blighted area definition.e2
(5) Detrimental land uses or conditions, such as incompatible uses, structures in
mixed use, or adverse influences from noise, smoke, or fumes.
(6) Unsafe, congested, poorly designed, or otherwise deficient streets.
(7) Inadequate public utilities or community facilities contributing to unsatisfactory
living conditions or economic decline.
(8) Other equally significant environmental deficiencies.
Id. at 2.
60. Id. RHA 7207.1, ch. 1, at 3-4. The listed influences were the following:
(a) Inadequate street layout.
(b) Incompatible uses or land use relationships.
(c) Overcrowding of buildings on the land.
(d) Excessive dwelling unit density.
(e) Obsolete buildings not suitable for improvement or conversion.
(f) Other identified hazards to health and safety and to the general well-being of the
community.
Id. at 4.
61. Cromnett v. City of Portland, 150 Me. 217, 235, 107 A.2d 841, 851 (1954).
62. Randolph v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 37 Del. Ch. 202, 218, 139 A.2d 476, 485
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Other courts, however, have been more receptive to condemnations based only upon a finding of blight. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Levin v. Township Committee of Bridgewater,"
for example, expressly upheld the use of eminent domain in a
blighted area. The court based its decision upon the following statutory standard:
[A]n area is blighted where there exists "[a] growing or total lack of proper
utilization of areas caused by the condition of the title, diverse ownership of
the real property therein and other conditions, resulting in a stagnant and
unproductive condition of land potentially useful and valuable for contributing to and serving the public health, safety, and welfare. ' ' "

Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court in a remarkable case accepted without question the government's condemnation of land
for purposes of clearance and redevelopment in an area that was
not blighted, but simply evidenced a "trend toward decreasing
utility and tax base."6 5
Notwithstanding these decisions, most courts have not had an
occasion to review the blighted area definition. The near-complete
acceptance of urban renewal, however, clearly does not guarantee
an equally broad acceptance of condemnation in areas that are defined as blighted simply because more productive use might be
made of the land. Thus, although the urban renewal cases are more
promising as authority for the government's use of eminent domain in downtown development projects than are the industrial
bond cases, they nevertheless do not provide as strong a basis for
support as initially appears. One further potential justification,
however, does exist; this rationale is that downtown redevelopment, in and of itself, is a public use that warrants a local government's invocation of eminent domain without reference to any
other persuasive authority.
3.

Downtown Redevelopment as an Independent Public Use

At least two courts have suggested that the redevelopment of
downtown areas, in and of itself, is a public use or public purpose
in the same way that the renewal of slums is a public use. In State
(1958); see also Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963) (failure to
meet "blighted area" definition will not necessarily defeat constitutionality).
63. 57 N.J. 506, 274 A.2d 1 (1971).
64. Id. at 510, 274 A.2d at 3 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55-21. 1(e) (West 1967); accord Romeo v. Cranston Redev. Agency, 105 R.I. 651, 254 A.2d 1 (1971).
65. City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1980).
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v. Coghill"6 the Supreme Court of West Virginia upheld the city of
Charlestown's plan to lease private commercial space in a publicly
owned parking garage and expressly noted that revitalization of
the city's downtown was a public purpose.e7 The court stated,
Certainly the creation of aesthetically appealing, convenient, and effi-

cient downtown urban centers is a public purpose and may be considered in
determining the validity of a particular parking facility. The development of
modern urban centers with open spaces, fountains, and malls in which people
may gather and enjoy an enhanced social and intellectual life is a public
purpose.68

More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Paley6" upheld a local government's issuance of bonds to be used to acquire
property-by condemnation if necessary-for resale to private
downtown developers. The target area was blighted, and, therefore,
the court relied on earlier cases upholding urban renewal in reaching its decision. The Illinois court, however, did not end its analysis with an analogy to the urban renewal cases; rather, the court
went on to express its belief that redevelopment of the downtown
area was justified because downtown redevelopment itself is a public purpose:
[T]he city's determination to promote the commercial rebirth of its
downtown area is a public purpose.... In so holding, today's decision notes
that the application of the public-purpose doctrine to sanction urban redevelopment can no longer be restricted to areas where crime, vacancy, or physical
decay produce undesirable living conditions or imperil public health. Stimulation of commercial growth and removal of economic stagnation are also
objectives which enhance the public weal.70

Unfortunately, neither the West Virginia nor the Illinois court articulated any of the rationales underlying its suggestion that
redeveloping the downtown area is an independent justification for
exercising the power of eminent domain. The balance of this subsection, therefore, examines various rationales that perhaps could
support such a proposition.
As mentioned above,7 1 downtown redevelopment efforts do not
generate jobs as effectively as the industrial development efforts
that are at issue in the industrial revenue bond cases. Downtown
projects generally are commercial in nature; new jobs, therefore,
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

156 W. Va. 877, 207 S.E.2d 113 (1973).
Id. at 884, 207 S.E.2d at 118.
Id.
68 Ill. 2d 62, 368 N.E.2d 915 (1977).
Id. at 74-75, 368 N.E.2d at 920-21.
See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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are unlikely to become part of the city's export base. Moreover,
these projects arguably may not create new jobs at all, since they
merely locate in the downtown region projects that might be developed somewhere else in the metropolitan area. Indeed, when considered from this perspective, local governmental support of downtown development arguably subsidizes the downtown businessman
at the expense of his suburban competitor.
Another argument concerning the creation of jobs, however,
which is often not available to support industrial development, can
be made for downtown projects. Many of the new jobs that downtown development creates-for example, work in hotels, retail
shops, and office buildings-are relatively unskilled and thus may
provide employment opportunities for people who lack the skills
for industrial work. Moreover, many of these potential workers live
near the downtown area and might be able to reach downtown jobs
more easily than they could commute to comparable jobs in the
suburbs. While industrial development projects do seek indirectly
to produce jobs for the working poor under the multiplier effect
associated with manufacturing jobs, downtown projects can be
used to provide these jobs outright.
Job creation, however, is not the only-perhaps not even the
major-goal of downtown development efforts,7 and the strength
of these other goals will determine the constitutional strength of
downtown development as a public use. One objective of these
projects is to ease the financial burden of city government. New
downtown development, of course, will add to the tax base; the
same value, however, also would be added if the development occurred on the city's fringe, as long as it was still within the city
limits. More important, the city's service infrastructure, especially
the streets and utilities, is already in place in the downtown area;
the same may not be true, however, for a new development elsewhere in the city, and thus the city government might have to
build new streets or extend utility lines to the areas where the development is occurring. Downtown development, then, encourages
the use of existing city facilities rather than requiring construction
of new ones. Thus, a city's encouragement of downtown projects at
least to some extent reflects only its careful stewardship of limited
public resources. The situation confronting the city is comparable
to the state government that constructs a large port facility and
72. Some downtown projects-for example, middle- and upper-income housing-will
create very few jobs for the unskilled.
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then must either build highways from producing areas to the port
or adopt tax policies that encourage the public to use the port.71
A second goal of downtown development is to assist in society's efforts to conserve energy. If gasoline prices increase further,
the use of public transportation undoubtedly will become an increasingly important conservation strategy. Downtown development uniquely supports this strategy because the downtown area is
the hub of existing public transportation systems and will continue
to occupy that position if these systems expand because of
shortages of energy supply. Indeed, one definitional characteristic
of a "downtown" may be that it lies at the center of the city's public transportation system. Furthermore, high density, large-scale
developments-which characterize the typical downtown project-are more energy-efficient than smaller, detached buildings
that house the same activities. Moreover, if downtown development draws developers to the inner city and away from its fringes,'
the city perhaps could avoid losing some of the producing farm74
land at the city's edge to other uses.
A third goal of downtown development is to enhance the capacity of a particular municipality to generate those attributes that
make cities exciting to their citizens and valuable to the community at large. These attributes-cultural institutions, highly specialized commercial enterprises, and the capacity to generate the
new small businesses that are the primary source of new jobs in
our economy-are the things that distinguish cities from other
forms of community organization.7 5 Most scholars would agree that
cultural institutions and specialized commercial enterprises will
prosper only in cities of significant size and density.7 6 Moreover,
considerable evidence supports the proposition that cities are more
effective as settings for new, job-creating enterprises when they are
large and development is dense. 7 Thus, as cities decentralize, they
are less likely to perform this characteristic community role.
73. See also State Highway Comm'n v. Asheville School, Inc., 276 N.C. 556, 173 S.E.2d
909 (1970). The court in Asheville School upheld the government's condemnation of land
that was needed to provide a driveway to a tract which was otherwise landlocked because of
a highway project. The condemnation reduced the cost of the highway project by making

the acquisition of the entire landlocked tract unnecessary.
74. The United States is losing approximately three million acres of rural land a year,
one million of which is prime farmland, to urban uses. U.S. Dm'T OF AGRICULTURE SOIL
CONSERVATION SERVICE, AMERICA'S SOIL AND WATER: CONDITIONS AND TRENDS 5 (1980).
75. Birch, Who Creates Jobs?, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1981, at 3.
76. J. ROTHENBERG, ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF URBAN RENEwAL 71 (1967).
77. See J. JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 180-202 (1969).
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Downtown redevelopment will not itself reverse decentralization,
of course, but it clearly is a necessary component of such a
reversal.
In sum, downtown development projects can provide jobs to
low-income persons who live near the downtown area; they are able
to take advantage of the existing public infrastructure; they promote energy conservation by making public transportation more
attractive; they can reduce the loss of productive farmland; and
they can enhance a city's capacity to provide those activities that
are unique to large and densely developed communities. The advantages from a large-scale downtown project, however, create
public benefits that do not necessarily accrue to the private developers; consequently, many private developers might not undertake
the project without some sort of public subsidy. Thus, another justification for public participation in these schemes is the failure of
the private sector to engage in activities that produce important
public benefits.7 8 Having thus identified the primary rationales for

a local government's taking some form of action in support of
downtown development, it is now possible to examine precisely
what kinds of public activities are warranted and whether public
exigencies are sufficiently strong to justify condemnation as one of
those activities.
The potential public benefits from downtown development
clearly support some kinds of public activities. A local government's desire to protect public investment in the existing infrastructure and to encourage energy conservation, for example,
would both easily justify certain forms of regulation. Similarly,
government spending programs that are designed to provide jobs
for the unskilled rarely run afoul of constitutional limitations.
When the government wishes to exercise eminent domain to support a downtown development project, however, it must show
something more; the question, of course, is how much more. One
characteristic of some public uses that seems to have been useful
in helping them survive constitutional attack is that the specific
location sought for acquisition is vital to the success of the public
project involved. In these situations the government's capacity-through the use of eminent domain-to coerce an unwilling
seller often is necessary to the acquisition of the site, and that very
78.

See Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970)

(discussing state housing loans to developers). The underlying rationale for the urban renewal program, of course, was the inability of the private sector to accomplish renewal itself.

Slayton, supra note 44, at 195.
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necessity strengthens the argument that the use is a public one.
Nichols recognized this point in his treatise on eminent domain
when he stated that
[courts] have been more ready to uphold a particular use of land as public
when, from the nature of the undertaking, it was impossible or difficult to
carry it out without the aid of eminent domain than in situations where a
particular site was not essential, and a suitable one could be secured equally
well by purchase.7 9

Industrial location is normally a matter of selecting a community,
rather than a specific site that is uniquely suitable for a new plant;
therefore, the relative antagonism of courts to the use of eminent
domain for industrial development is not surprising5 0 On the other
hand, urban renewal's avowed purpose was the removal of existing
slums and blight, and that purpose could only be realized by condemning specific properties. These two lines of cases lead to the
question of how important location is to major downtown development projects.
Under most downtown development schemes, one specific location will rarely be crucial to the commercial success of the various private components of the project. Hotels, office buildings, and
middle- and upper-income housing often might be located at any
one of several downtown sites and do equally well. These developments would require parking within close proximity, of course, but
that could be an integral part of the project. The situation might
be different, however, with large-scale commercial projects such as
Philadelphia's Gallery or Baltimore's Harborplace, since attracting
foot traffic is crucial to the success of these projects, and being located a block away from, rather than at, a pedestrian crossroad
could make the difference in a business' decision to invest or go
79. 2A P. NicHOLS, supra note 8, § 7.211.
80. Indeed, some of the cases in which courts have been generous in permitting condemnation for industrial development or expansion have concerned projects in which the
specific site sought was unusually important. In.a case before the Michigan Supreme Court,
for example, the City of Detroit argued that its extensive condemnations were necessary to
save 6000 jobs in the Detroit area and that the site involved was the only one acceptable to
the General Motors Corporation. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 401 Mich. 616,
304 N.W.2d 455 (1981). The city argued that if the plant was not built at the desired site,
the company would not remain in the Detroit area. Id. at 630-31, 304 N.W.2d at 458. Similarly, the court in Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d
327, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975), found that the City of Yonkers' condemnation of land that
suffered from "economic underdevelopment and stagnation" was in fact necessary to expand
the existing, adjacent Otis Elevator plant. The company had threatened to leave the community if it could not expand, and the land bordering the plant was the only place in the
area where the company could move. Id. at 482, 483, 335 N.E.2d at 331, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 117,
118.
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elsewhere. Nevertheless, if one looks only at the needs of the private developer, eminent domain will only occasionally be justifiable
from a constitutional standpoint for downtown development
projects.
The private developer's interest, however, clearly is not the
only interest that must be considered in these determinations. A
single development project does not in itself revive a downtown
area; rather, such a project is expected to stimulate others to return to or remain in the downtown, and this stimulative effect is
the real justification for public assistance to the project. The site of
a single major project, therefore, may be crucial to the success of
overall downtown development. An office building/apartment complex placed along a downtown river, for example, is unlikely to
stimulate further development if it is separated from the rest of
downtown by a major highway.8 1 Similarly, a hotel/commercial
center that is located several blocks from existing downtown activity-a distance that the new project is not strong enough to bridge
with secondary development-may create two weak downtown
clusters, rather than one strong section. Thus, location can be a
crucial factor for major projects in reaching the public benefits
that are sought, and, therefore, the government's condemnation of
land in a particular location may serve a public use.
This proposition, however, does not authorize a city to condemn property for every person who wishes to replace a watch repair shop with a fashionable boutique. On the contrary condemnation should be permitted only in the cases of the very large
projects-hotels, office buildings, apartments, condominiums, department stores, or shopping centers-that will have the stimulative effect which creates the public use. The courts, however,
should not be required to make case by case determinations
whether a particular project is sufficiently major to warrant condenonation. This task is more appropriately reserved for the legislature. Any legislation that authorizes the use of eminent domain
for downtown development should limit this use to major projects
and should require that the condemning agency find sufficient evidence that the particular project in question will significantly stimulate further private development. This finding would then be reviewable in the courts only on the question whether the finding
was reasonable-in other words, not arbitrary or capricious. This
81. Jane Jacobs has pointed out how borders such as highways discourage urban
growth. J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 257-69 (1961).
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division of responsibility is comparable to the requirement of a
finding of blight in urban renewal law: the basic responsibility for
the condemnation rests with the local agency; the court simply reviews the finding of blight to determine whether it was arbitrary or
capricious. 812
B.

Voluntary Acquisition

If the government's purchase of land is voluntarily agreed to
by the owner, rather than forced upon him through the use of eminent domain, the nature of the constitutional inquiry changes. The
appropriate test shifts from requiring a public use to requiring a
public purpose-which, as discussed above,8" entails a slightly different test from the former. The public use test is the more difficult standard to meet because of its especially direct impact on the
condemnee, as opposed to the more dispersed impact of raising,
general resources. Thus, if a particular governmental activity meets
the public use test, it usually also will meet the public purpose
test. The converse is not necessarily true, however, since an activity may not constitute a public use even though it serves a public
purpose. This section of the Article examines the same three doctrinal bases that were discussed under the eminent domain analysis and attempts to determine whether these bases support governmental involvement in a voluntary acquisition. 4
1.

Urban Renewal

To the extent that the urban renewal cases support the use of
eminent domain, they also support voluntary acquisitions. Similarly, to the extent that the broader elements of the definition of
blighted area fail to support eminent domain, they also probably
fail to support voluntary acquisitions. As was noted above, 85 the
82. See, e.g., Apostle v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. 2d 59, 422 P.2d 289 (1966).
83. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
84. One other possible basis of support is available for a government's acquisition and
resale of downtown property. If the property is architecturally or historically significant,
e.g., listed in the National Register of Historic Places or located in a registered historic
district, the property's importance as an architectural or historical landmark may justify
governmental action to protect it. Often the government purchases the property, perhaps
repairs or renovates it, and then sells it to private interests subject to covenants that are
designed to protect the architectural or historical integrity of the property. The constitutionality of this type of property transaction is not disputed. See Flaccomio v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 194 Md. 275, 71 A.2d 12 (1950). For a description of such a project, see 38 J.
Hous. 165 (1981).
85. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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statutory definition of blighted area in urban renewal law is suspect as authority for a government's use of eminent domain when
it relies on characteristics such as "faulty lot layout," "diversity of
ownership," "excessive tax or special assessment delinquency,"
"defective or unusual conditions of title," or "improper subdivision
or platting." Each of these characteristics impedes private redevelopment by making site assembly difficult; the definition, therefore,
seems to have been written primarily to justify use of eminent domain. Once it fails in that effort, the definition can be recognized
as an otherwise artificial characterization of blight. That being so
there is no assurance that the government would be eliminating
blight by purchasing and clearing property in an area meeting the
definition. Thus, the definition offers no support for an unforced
acquisition.
2.

Downtown Redevelopment

The analysis for using the argument that downtown redevelopment is itself a public use to support a government's unforced acquisition of property is similar to that which was applied in the
previous subsection. To the extent that the concept of downtown
redevelopment as a public use is persuasive, the proposition that
redevelopment serves a public purpose also should be persuasive.
If the public use argument is unpersuasive, however, it remains
true that the benefits cited to support that argument8 6 do support
some sorts of governmental action. The question then is whether
they will support a government expenditure to acquire property in
a voluntary transaction.
One benefit of downtown redevelopment is that the project
can take advantage of the existing public infrastructure instead of
requiring the government to install new streets and utility lines.
This practice protects existing public investment and reduces the
demands on limited public resources. Governments routinely produce this benefit through regulatory vehicles such as zoning, but
they also do so by managing their expenditures. Local governments, for example, may extend water and sewer lines or locate
facilities such as parks or schools in a pattern that guides or encourages development in specific directions, and one factor underlying a government's decision about which direction to favor is the
relative cost of providing services to development in one area as
opposed to another. Perhaps even more closely analogous to the
86.

See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
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downtown question, a state that wishes to encourage the use of a
state-owned port certainly may widen highways from other parts of
the state that lead to the port, since the improved roads probably
would encourage public use of the new facility.
Other benefits that are the result of downtown redevelopment
are energy conservation and the protection of farmland." Once
again, these benefits can be sought through regulation, but also
they may be acquired through expenditure programs. For example,
governments may purchase either land or development easements
in land as a means of preserving farmland that is located on the
city's periphery. Of course, purchasing land for a downtown developer does not preserve farmland as directly as purchasing the
farmland or easements outright, but this type of purchase is certainly less costly since the developer must compensate the city for
the land, and the city ultimately enhances its tax base.
Thus, some authority supports the proposition that downtown
development serves a public purpose that warrants the expenditure of government funds. This authority, however, is neither direct nor particularly strong. Moreover, one of the primary justifications for the use of eminent domain-the importance of location to
successful downtown development-is not applicable to an unforced acquisition. If property at the "right" location may be purchased voluntarily, then a private purchaser can acquire the land
as easily as the local government. Thus, if proponents of the need
for eminent domain for downtown development are unpersuasive
in their arguments, then the justification for unforced acquisition
also is likely to be unpersuasive.
3.

Industrial Development

The third possible doctrinal basis for the government's exercise of its eminent domain power in downtown development
cases-the industrial development cases-presents a stronger argument for unforced acquisitions than the first two rationales. Although the industrial development bond cases do not provide
strong support for the use of eminent domain 8s they become relevant when the transaction is voluntary. The typical underlying
transaction in industrial financing is the government's acquisition
of land, followed by a leasing-and usually an eventual sale-of
the property to a private concern. The principal differences be87.
88.

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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tween the typical industrial transaction and a comparable downtown transaction concern the nature of the government's financial
commitment and the nature of the development of the property.
As discussed above, 89 most industrial development bond cases
concern revenue bonds. Courts frequently emphasize the government's limited liability under these obligations, since the bondholder's remedy is against the property rather than against the issuing government, in the event that the leasing enterprise fails.90
If, in the downtown context, the money that is used to purchase
property from a willing seller for reconveyance to a private developer comes from revenue bond proceeds, the situation would parallel that of industrial development bonds. In many cases, of course,
the funds will be derived from other sources such as current receipts (including local taxes), federal grant money, or general obligation bonds. Even in these situations, however, a number of parallels can be drawn between industrial development bonds and
supporting downtown development through unforced acquisitions.
The most important constitutional point about revenue bonds is
the relative absence of any risk factor for the government. In most
instances of an unforced acquisition for downtown development
the acquiring government knows the identity of the developer to
whom the property will be conveyed before the government acquires the property. If the government and the developer enter
into agreements concerning resale before the property is acquired,
the government's risk factor becomes extremely low, perhaps even
low enough to justify the analogy to the bond cases. 91
It also was noted above" ' that most bond cases are concerned
with industrial projects, which have an attendant multiplier effect
on employment; downtown projects, however, normally are commercial in nature and only rarely create manufacturing jobs. This
distinction, together with the lack of support in the industrial development cases themselves, led to the conclusion that these decisions do not support eminent domain for downtown development.
The cases do provide authority, however, for the government's
89. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., State v. City of Pittsburg, 188 Kan. 612, 364 P.2d 71 (1961); Carruthers v.
Port of Astoria, 249 Or. 329, 438 P.2d 725 (1968).
91. A few of the bond cases have dealt with general obligation bonds rather than revenue bonds. See supra note 34. In states that have upheld general obligation bonds, the
government's unforced acquisition of property for downtown development is much more
likely to withstand constitutional challenges.
92. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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ability to obtain property through unforced acquisitions, since
bonds-supported projects and voluntary sales in effect constitute
similar property transactions. The difference between industrial
and commercial jobs, therefore, is the only significant distinction
between these two types of governmental activity. Moreover, even
this distinction loses much of its force because downtown projects
often create service jobs that the relatively unskilled can perform.
Thus, the difference probably is not sufficiently important to discredit the analogy between industrial development and downtown
development through voluntary transactions. The industrial development case law, then, supports unforced acquisitions."
C. Subsidized Conveyances
The final set of issues in the area of land transactions to support downtown development concerns the validity of various subsidies that are given in the conveyance of the property from the government to the private developer. This section of the Article
examines the validity of three kinds of subsidies. The first of these
three subsidies occurs if the government reduces the developer's
need for immediate capital either by leasing the property - perhaps with an option to purchase-or by selling it on an installment
basis, assuming that a fair consideration is paid for the land under
the lease or sales contract. The second way in which the government can subsidize a private developer is to "write-down" or absorb some of the developer's acquisition and clearance costs, or to
convey the land for its "use" value, which is the value of the land
as determined by the use to which it can be put under any restrictions that the seller may have imposed. The last form of government subsidy occurs when the government in effect gives the land
to the developer by conveying it either for a very low monetary
consideration or for no consideration at all.
93.

Very little case law exists that directly questions the validity of a govermient's

unforced acquisition and resale of property for downtown development. The cases that have
been decided, however, generally have denied the government power to acquire land for this
purpose. In Lassila v. City of Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d 804, 576 P.2d 54 (1978), for example;
the court held that a government's purchase of downtown property for the purpose of resale
to the developer of a theatre unconstitutionally lent the city's credit. A theatre, of course,
provides almost no jobs, and, therefore, the case does not seriously oppose the conclusion of
this Article. Furthermore, Washington courts remain antagonistic to industrial development
revenue bonds. See Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of the Port of Longview, 85 Wash. 2d
216, 527 P.2d 263 (1974); see also Reel v. City of Freeport, 61 Ill. App. 2d 448, 209 N.E.2d

675 (1965) (city's sale of parking lot to defendant and taking of plaintiffs property to replace it did not constitute a public use).
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Those who challenge property conveyances from government
entities usually rely upon two kinds of constitutional
private
to
provisions. The most specific type of provision prohibits gifts or
donations of public funds or property to private entities. The New
Mexico Constitution, for example, directs that "[n]either the state,
nor any county, school district or municipality, . . . shall ...
make any donation to or in aid of any person, association or public
or private corporation."94 A less specific but more prevalent kind of
constitutional provision prohibits governments from giving or loaning the public credit to private entities. Thus, the Florida Constitution prohibits the legislature from authorizing "any county, city,
borough, township or incorporated district. . . to loan its credit to
any corporation, association, institution or individual." 95 Although
at least one commentator has suggested that loan of credit provisions do not apply when the government neither incurs its own
debt nor guarantees private debt, but simply makes an expenditure from current resources, 98 courts seem willing to rely on this
type of a provision to uphold challenges to certain public actions
when no other provision is available. 7 Whatever the constitutional
basis, it is well established that local governments may not give
away public property. 98
1.

Lease Agreements or Installment Sales as a Form of
Government Subsidy

By leasing property to a developer or selling it on an installN.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14.
FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. 9, § 10. This provision has been amended and appears in
FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 10. A number of these provisions apply only to the state and make no
mention of local governments. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2. Despite this language,
however, courts usually have extended these provisions to apply to local governments. See,
e.g., Connor v. Herrick, 349 Mich. 201, 84 N.W.2d 427 (1957); State v. York, 164 Neb. 223,
82 N.W.2d 269 (1957); Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967).
96. Pinsky, supra note 7, at 279.
97. See O'Neill v. Burns, 198 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1967). Article 9, § 10 of the 1885 Florida
Constitution prohibited the state from loaning its credit to private organizations and prohibited the state legislature from authorizing local governments to loan their credit or appropriate money to private organizations. Despite the absence of an express prohibition on
state appropriations to private organizations, the court in O'Neill held that such an appropriation violated § 10. Florida has since amended this constitutional provision. See FLA.
CONST. art. 7, § 10. See also Kaplan v. City of Huntington Woods, 357 Mich. 612, 99 N.W.2d
514 (1959) (municipalities may not give away public property without a consideration).
These gifts are proscribed in North Carolina under a constitutional direction that "[n]o
person ... is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32; see Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N.C. 691, 36 S.E.2d 281 (1945).
98. 2A C. ANTIEAU, supra note 8, § 20.30; C. RHYNE, supra note 24, § 31.7.
94.
95.
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ment basis, a government reduces the developer's need for either
equity capital or borrowed funds. By improving the developer's return on his equity, the government makes downtown investment
more attractive. When compared to the developer who must
purchase his land immediately, therefore, the lessee or installment
buyer has received a slight public subsidy.9 9 Thus far, however, no
court has found a constitutional problem in this form of indirect
subsidy;. rather, courts consistently have looked at the total consideration for the lease or installment sale and have upheld the transaction unless the consideration was unreasonable. 100 The courts'
generally favorable attitude towards this practice indicates that
there might be considerations motivating the government other
than simply to entice a developer to invest by offering him a small
subsidy-considerations that could cause the government to lease
or sell on time rather than sell by immediate payment. By leasing
to a developer, for example, the government maintains some control over the property and thus is in a better position to make certain that the property continues to be put to a publicly beneficial
use than if it were to convey the fee. In any event, no constitutional impediments constrain this type of governmental assistance
to a downtown developer.
2. Write-Downs to Use Value as a Form of Government
Subsidy
A more direct and substantial subsidy occurs when a local government sells property to a developer at a price that is below the
government's own costs of acquisition, relocation, and clearance.
This type of government "write-down" was a standard part of the
federal urban renewal program, under which the federal govern99. Another sort of subsidy also might result from leasing-rather than selling-property to a developer. In a number of states government-owned property is exempt
from property taxation, regardless of its use. Thus, property leased to a developer might in
effect be exempted from the property tax. See Wein v. Beame, 43 N.Y.2d 326, 372 N.E.2d
300, 401 N.Y.S;2d 458 (1977).
100. See, e.g., Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952) (lease
with an option to purchase); Singer Architectural Servs. Co. v. Doyle, 74 Mich. App. 485,
254 N.W.2d 587 (1977) (sale of land by land contract); City of Clovis v. Southwestern Pub.
Serv. Co., 49 N.M. 270, 161 P.2d 878 (1945) (installment sale of utility system with no interest on the unpaid balance). A government lessor or seller also can improve a developer's
cash flow position by requiring a smaller rent or installment payment in the first few years
of the project, when the developer's cash needs typically are more acute. As long as the
government receives a fair rental value or price over the life of the lease or sales contract,
the cases cited above would support a system of payments that are graduated over time.
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ment met at least two-thirds of the cost/price differential. 101 In the
state statutes that authorized local governmental participation in
urban renewal the resale price of the property usually was characterized, among other ways, as "use" value, "reuse" value, and
"fair" value. 102 This value was lower than the government's investment for two reasons. First, although slum areas were by definition
threatening to the public health and safety, they were not necessarily unprofitable to their owners. Indeed, the profitability of slum
ownership made the costs of private acquisition and clearance too
high to attract private investment; if private investment was going
to occur, therefore, some government subsidy was necessary. Second, to assure that the area did not once again become a slum, the
redevelopment had to comply with public plans that severely limited the uses which could be made of each parcel of land in the
redevelopment area. This use limitation made the land less attractive and depressed the value of the property. State statutes indirectly guaranteed that the property would be sold at a reasonable
price-given these restrictions-by requiring either that the redevelopment agency sell the land by some competitive process, which
by definition would establish the market value for a parcel of land
limited to one or a few specific uses, or that it sell the land only
after having the property independently appraised.101
The courts had no trouble upholding written-down sales in the
urban renewal context against attacks as unconstitutional loans of
credit or donations. As long as the buyer was paying what the
property was worth for the purpose or purposes to which it might
be put, the courts generally have held that no donation or loan of
credit had taken place.1 0 These cases indicate that a similar writedown would be constitutional for a downtown project as long as
the price that the investor paid for the land was roughly equal to
the property's "use" value. Of course, such a sale would be even
more likely to withstand constitutional attack if it were based on a
public plan for the project area and accompanied by specific use
restrictions on the parcel.
See Slayton, supra note 44, at 200-02.
CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4527(a) (1975) (fair value); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
205.5 (1978) (use value); 1945 N.Y. Laws ch. 887, § 1 (reuse value) (repealed 1961).
103. See Ky Rv. STAT. § 99.450 (1971) (appraisal sale); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-514
(1976) (competitive sale).
104. See, e.g., Velishka v. City of Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571 (1954); 64th St.
Residences Inc. v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 268, 150 N.E.2d 396, 174 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1958).
101.

102. See DEL.
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Nominal Monetary Consideration

As noted above, 105 a local government may not give away
property. The consideration that the government receives for the
property, however, does not have to be entirely monetary. One
court, for example, has held that a lessor's promise to maintain
unneeded city property during the term of the lease was adequate
consideration even though the monetary consideration that the lessor paid was only one dollar.0 8 Nevertheless, when this premise is
applied to transfers of property as part of a downtown development project for nominal or no consideration, the constitutionality
of the transaction may come under attack. Two forms of nonmonetary consideration merit discussion in this context: the grantee's
promise to use the property for public, as opposed to private, purposes; and the economic benefits that accrue to the community
from the grantee's use of the property.
In most states a government, under certain circumstances,
may give property to a private agency in return for the agency's
commitment to use the property for public activities.0 7 Although a
downtown development project is under private ownership, it arguably is a public activity. Moreover, if the government involvement is based on the need to renew slums or blighted areas, many
courts have upheld the disposition of renewal area property to private developers as a basic part of the renewal effort. 10 8 These
courts have reasoned that the active public purpose or use could
not be realized until the property was renewed, and that the government's clearance of the land was only a halfway measure.1'0
This reasoning also could be applied to acquisitions and dispositions under the theory that downtown redevelopment is a public
use or public purpose, or that these transactions promote industrial development. Under either theory, the private project is a
necessary step in reaching the public goal.
Notwithstanding this potential line of reasoning, the thesis of
this subsection is that the cases alluded to above do not support
gifts of land to a downtown developer on the premise that the developer will undertake public activities on the property and in that
105. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also Grand Lodge of Ga., Indep.
Order of Odd Fellows v. City of Thomasville, 226 Ga. 4, 172 S.E.2d 612 (1970).
106. City of New Orleans v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 223 La. 363, 65 So. 2d 796 (1953).
107. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
109. State ex rel. Allerton Parking Corp. v. City of Cleveland, 4 Ohio App. 2d 57, 211
N.E.2d 203 (1965); see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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way offer adequate consideration for the transaction. The cases
that have upheld donations of land-or of money-have done so
only under very limited circumstances. The public activities that
were to be undertaken on the property or with public funds were
primarily activities that were not likely to return a commercial
profit: museums and art galleries; 110 libraries;"' volunteer fire departments; 1 2 hospitals;"' and social service and mental health
programs.1 4 Furthermore, in most cases the government had
donated the land to a nonprofit organization. 1 15 When the activity
was one that might have been commercially profitable and the recipient was organized for profit, at least one court has rejected the
argument that the recipient's commitment to undertake public activities was sufficient consideration for the donation. 1 6 An investor
who is considering investing in a downtown development project is
interested only because he sees a potential profit accruing from his
investment. Because of this inherent profit motive, the courts are
not likely to permit local governments to assist private developers
in profiting from a-gift of property if the only consideration that
the developer furnishes is to perform "public activities" on the
land.
The second possible type of nonmonetary consideration is the
economic benefits that will accrue to the community from the private use of the land. The South Carolina Supreme Court in McKinney v. City of Greenville"7 held that economic benefits of this
nature are an acceptable and adequate consideration for government land. The court in McKinney validated a series of leases of a
one hundred acre tract from a county to a private corporation; the
lease agreements provided that the term of the lease would run for
a period of ninety-nine years. Although the county had paid $3,500
an acre for the land, the only real consideration that the corporation gave in exchange for the lease was the promise to construct a
specified minimum amount of capital improvements on the
land-ten million dollars by the end of ten years and twenty-five
110.
111.
112.
1979).
113.
114.
(1875).
115.
116.
117.

See Furlong v. South Park Comm'rs 340 I1. 363, 172 N.E. 757 (1930).
See Raney v. City of Lakeland, 88 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1956).
See generally Janusaitis v. Middleburg Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.
See Finan v. Mayor of Cumberland, 154 Md. 563, 141 A. 269 (1928).
See City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Home for Friendless Women, 50 Ind. 215
See cases cited supra notes 110-14.
See City of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955).
262 S.C. 227, 203 S.E.2d 680 (1974).
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million dollars by the end of the full period. This promise, however, was sufficient for the South Carolina court, which reaffirmed
a state rule that indirect public benefits-such as promotion and
diversification of the economy-and an enhanced tax base are sufficient to overcome a lack of monetary consideration in some government contracts.1 1
South Carolina apparently is the only state that accepts economic benefits as adequate consideration for public donations 19
South Carolina's minority position, however, is not surprising,
since its rule is flatly inconsistent with the historical background of
donation and loan of credit provisions. These provisions, together
with bans on holding stock in private corporations and-to some
extent-the public purpose doctrine itself, emerged from the experiences of governmental aid to railroads in the nineteenth century.1 20 During this period, local governments often provided assistance to the railroads in the hope-perhaps even the confident
expectation-that prosperity would arrive with the trains. When
prosperity and, quite often, the railroad itself failed to come, the
resulting public outcry led to the restrictive constitutional provisions mentioned above. Since a general economic benefit to the
community had been the expected consideration for railroad aid,
to characterize a general economic benefit as adequate consideration to support a transfer of governmental property to a private
entity would circumvent the constitutional restrictions imposed as
a result of the painful lessons of railroad aid. In all likelihood,
then, the judiciary will react negatively to an allegedly constitutional donation based solely on a promise of general economic benefit to the community.
4.

Summary

Under current law, no constitutional violation should occur
when a government leases land or sells it under an installment
sales contract. Similarly, a lease or sale for a price that is writtendown to use value should encounter no constitutional difficulties. A
court, however, would almost certainly hold that a conveyance of
land to a downtown developer for only a minimal monetary consideration is unconstitutional.
118. Id. at 245-46, 203 S.E.2d at 689.
119. There is apparently very little case law on point; this scarcity perhaps reflects the
peculiarity of the suggestion. For a case that has held contrary to South Carolina's rule, see
Southern Ry. Co. v. Hartshorne, 162 Ala. 491, 50 So. 139 (1909).
120. For a brief history of these provisions, see Pinsky, supra note 7, at 277-82.
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III.

USE OF PuBLIC FACILITIES

A second category of problems for governments that wish to
participate in downtown development projects arises when a downtown project envisions the construction of both public and private
facilities. Ideally, of course, each facility will reinforce the other
and make its counterpart successful when that success might not
have occurred otherwise. A typical combination in these projects is
a public parking facility and a public convention center together
with a private hotel. The public contribution also might include
office buildings, a transportation terminal or transfer point, or recreational facilities, and the private facility within the project might
instead be office space or residences.
Legal problems arise if the mutual reinforcement mechanism
provides too great a benefit to the private facility; they include
questions of public purpose, loan of credit, and the like. The characterization of the problem depends upon the nature of the public
role in the project. This part of the Article, therefore, focuses on
three recurrent governmental roles. In the first of these roles the
public facility is positioned in a location that is particularly beneficial to the private facility- when, for example, a parking garage is
placed next door to a hotel. In the second situation the government
provides space to private users in a public facility-when, for instance, a public parking garage includes space on the first floor for
shops along the street. In the third and final scenario discussed
below the government conveys air rights above the public facility
to a private developer; the public agency in this role might be acquiring all the land for the project.
A. Beneficial Location
Positioning one or more public facilities in a location where
they will be particularly useful to the users of a nearby private
facility should withstand constitutional challenge, especially since
public facilities normally are located in response to private needs.
If a new office building, department store, or hotel creates a need
for parking, then a city should be able to respond to that need and
finance the construction of a parking facility,121 just as it is free to
121. After World War II, when cities first began providing public parking on a large
scale, the cities had to defend themselves against challenges that these facilities were of
particular benefit to nearby businesses and thus served a private rather than a public purpose. The cities, however, won this battle long ago. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 373 (1949).
At least one court has suggested that while it is permissible to provide parking which
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improve roads to facilitate access to a newly constructed private
shopping center. 12 2 Furthermore, if the proximity of the private facility enhances the success of the public facility-as a hotel might
enhance the success of a convention center-then the government's
location decision simply represents good management. The case
law amply supports these general principles. 2 3

If the public and private facilities are located within an urban
renewal area and are constructed pursuant to an urban renewal
plan, the argument favoring the validity of the public facility's location becomes even stronger, since the location decision gains the
added public purpose of furthering the redevelopment of the
blighted area.1 2 This proposition also would extend to downtown
125
development if the latter is accepted as a public purpose.
B. Provision of Private Space in Public Facilities
By renting space to private users in otherwise public facilities,
a government, if it permits rent payments at rates below the private market's rates, can encourage development in a downtown
area. Under this type of rental arrangement, the government typically rents first floor, street-front space in a parking facility to private stores. Other possibilities include a government's rental of ofwill benefit downtown businesses generally, a city should not do so if only a single business
will benefit. See, e.g., Goldberg v. City Council of Charleston, 273 S.C. 140, 254 S.E.2d 803
(1979). This decision, however, fails to explain why a city should be permitted to build a
300-space garage if several businesses create the demand, but not if a single business creates
it. Moreover, it is more accurate to say that all downtown businesses created the demand,
not just those closest to the garage. Ideally, the garage should be located in a place where it
will provide the greatest convenience to the greatest number of customers.
122. See In re Legislative Route 62214, Section 1-A, 425 Pa. 349, 229 A.2d 1 (1967).
123. See, e.g., In re Incorporated Village of Garden City, 15 A.D.2d 513, 222 N.Y.S.2d
413 (1961) (mem.) (parking lot adjacent to hospital); Superior Laundry & Towel Supply Co.
v. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio Op. 2d 352, 168 N.E.2d 447 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 170
Ohio St. 191, 163 N.E.2d 164 (1959) (parking lots near major league baseball stadium);
Thunderbird Motel, Inc. v. City of Portland, 40 Or. App. 697, 596 P.2d 994 (1979) (tennis
court near hotel and skybridge from hotel to parking lot); Seligsohn v. Philadelphia Parking
Auth., 412 Pa. 372, 194 A.2d 606 (1963) (parking garage across the street from two department stores).
A fact situation could arise, of course, in which the benefit to a single private business is
so individualized that a court would question the public nature of the city's action. See
Denihan Enters., Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 99 N.E.2d 235 (1951). This kind of case,
however, probably would concern more than mere location. In Denihan, for example, plaintiff alleged that a large number of spaces in the challenged parking structure were to be set
aside for a single apartment house, and that the specifications established for the construction and operation contract were written for the obvious benefit of this apartment house.
124. See R.E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1978).
125. See supra notes 66-82 and accompanying text.
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fice space in a public office building, or its rental of office or retail
space in a public harbor development.
When a local government creates such a leasehold arrangement, it often must defend its actions against challenges that the
lease of a portion of the public facility to the private users changes
the nature of the entire facility from public to private. The government will prevail if the private use is temporary, since governments clearly may construct facilities that are larger than their
current needs demand and lease the excess space to private users
until the space is needed. '2 Similarly, a local government can
safely proceed if the private use is related to and in fact reinforces
the public use. Thus, a parking garage may contain a privately
operated filling station or repair shop,' public buildings may contain privately operated food services, 12 8 and an airport may contain
a host of private users, from the shops in the terminal building to
12
the office and hanger facilities of the airlines. '
Private shops contained in a public parking garage, however,
are not related to the public use. Moreover, if one purpose of permitting the shops is to further downtown development, then the
shops are not likely to be temporary. Thus, courts that have upheld this type of lease arrangement have relied upon the "incidental" relationship of the shops to the underlying public facility. Wilmington Parking Authority v. Ranken'3 0 illustrates the most
common judicial approach to this problem. In Ranken the parking
authority proposed to erect an eight hundred car parking garage
and to incorporate into the garage a department store and other
commercial and office space. About thirty-nine percent of the facility was to be commercially leased. The construction of this space
would constitute almost sixty percent of the entire cost of the garage, and the leases were expected to provide a return of almost
seventy percent of the facility's gross revenues. The court in
Ranken first found that some incidental leasing by the government
was permissible 3 1 and then sought to delineate the appropriate
test to use in determining what constitutes "incidental.' 13 2 The
126. See, e.g., Lerch v. Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md. 438, 214 A.2d 761 (1965).
127. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 105 A.2d 614 (1954); Gate
City Garage v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
128. See Gate City Garage v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
129. State v. County of Dade, 210 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1968).
130. 34 Del. Ch. 439, 105 A.2d 614 (1954).
131. Id. at 449-50, 105 A.2d at 620-21.
132. Id. at 452, 105 A.2d at 622.
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Delaware court rejected a percentage test, whether based upon the
cost of the facility or the amount of the space at issue;133 instead,
the court fashioned a test that would permit incidental leases only
to the extent that their revenues were necessary to make the facility self-supporting.""' Under this test the Delaware court approved
the proposed project.
Considering the arbitrariness of any standard that is based on
the percentage of cost or space, the Ranken court's test seems to
be the preferable one, and it appears to represent the majority
view not only for parking facilities 3 5 but also for projects such as
harbor developments 3 8 and freight terminals.137 Indeed, the prin-

cipal case invalidating a proposed project that was to include commercial leases also conforms to this view: in that case the court
invalidated the proposed project because the lease revenues 1were
38
not necessary to make the garage in question self-supporting.
This financial necessity test, however, does present some
rather difficult problems. First, if commercial leases in a parking
facility are permissible when they are necessary to the facility's
self-sufficiency, the question arises whether the courts should allow
the commercial space to be built next door, across the street, or
several miles away. Although the Ranken court discussed the interdependency of the public and private uses and suggested that their
coexistence in a single structure was part of that interdependency, 39 some artificiality is inherent in the court's distinction. If
a parking authority purchases a city block and builds a single
structure on it, with forty percent of the space reserved for commercial leases, the authority's actions would be permissible under
the Ranken decision. On the other hand, if two structures were
133. Id. at 460, 105 A.2d at 626-27.
134. Id. at 461, 105 A.2d at 627.
135. See Jackson Redev. Auth. v. King, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1104 (Miss. 1978); State ex rel.
City of Charleston v. Coghill, 156 W. Va. 877, 107 S.E.2d 113 (1973).
136. See Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957).
137. See Bush Terminal Co. v. City of New York, 282 N.Y. 306, 26 N.E.2d 269 (1940).
This case demonstrates that "incidental" does not necessarily mean "insignificant." The
Port of New York Authority had constructed an "Inland Terminal Building" in Manhattan
for unloading certain shipments. The railroads using the terminal needed only the basement
and part of the first floor of the building to conduct their business. The remainder of the 16story structure was leased to various commercial and industrial concerns. The legislation
authorizing the construction of the facility required it to be self-supporting. Because of high
costs-especially Manhattan land prices--however, the facility could only meet that requirement by extending commercial and industrial leases. The court upheld the project,
characterizing as "incidental" uses that required at least 90% of the building space.
138. Shizas v. City of Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589 (1952).

139.

34 Del. Ch. at 460, 105 A.2d at 626.
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built on the same block, one strictly for parking and the other for
commercial leases, and the leases constituted forty percent of the
total space of the two structures, the leases-under the Ranken
test-would not withstand judicial scrutiny. Notwithstanding this
artificiality, however, the Ranken line of analysis is probably the
correct one. A government cannot support its operations by becoming a commercial landlord, 140 and the commercial leases ap-

proved in Ranken and similar cases are a limited exception to this
general rule. The courts must draw a line somewhere, and such a
line is more easily supported when it falls between a single structure and two adjoining structures than when it falls between two
adjoining structures and two structures that are an undetermined
distance apart.
A much more substantial difficulty with the financial necessity
test is its assumption that the public facility is supported by revenues rather than taxes. Indeed, in each of the cases that have dealt
with the issue the local government financed the facility with revenue bonds. A question arises, therefore, concerning the force that
these cases, and their rule regarding cQmmercial leases, have when
the facility either is not financed by revenue bonds or is not a revenue-producing facility at all.
Parking garages and harbor developments, to name two examples, need not be financed with revenue bonds. On the contrary,
they often are financed either with general obligation bonds or out
of current revenues such as general revenue sharing.1 41 When a

government uses some form of financing other than revenue bonds,
the facility has no legal obligation to earn revenues that are sufficient to meet its operations and debt service. When one of these
other forms of financing is used, the financial necessity test provides little guidance about whether "incidental" commercial leases
should be permitted and, if so, under what standard.
If the facility is one of a type for which revenue bond financing is common-such as a parking garage-then the Ranken standard would be appropriate even if general obligation bonds or
some other nonrevenue generating means of financing was used.
When general obligation bonds are used to finance a revenue producing facility, facility revenues frequently retire the bonds and
the government never uses its taxing power. Indeed, voters often
140.

Rathbun v. City of Salinas, 30 Cal. App. 3d 199, 106 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1973).

141. See, e.g., North Carolina State Ports Auth. v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
242 N.C. 416, 88 S.E.2d 109 (1955) (harbor development bond); Stanpart Realty Corp. v.
City of Norfolk, 199 Va. 716, 101 S.E.2d 527 (1958) (parking facility bond).
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are told at the time when they vote upon the bonds in a referendum that the government intends to pay off the bonds in precisely
this fashion.14 The local government in these situations often will
use general obligation debt because this type of debt normally is
less expensive than revenue debt.143 Thus, in cases in which the
revenues are intended to meet operating costs and provide debt
service even though they are not required to do so, the Ranken
test is appropriate and should be used.
A more troubling situation arises when the facility is one that
does not normally produce revenue-or at least does not produce
the amount of revenues that are necessary to meet either operating
or capital costs. For example, a city might wish to include small
street-front shops in a new downtown library or, in the manner of
Yale University's Center for British Art,14 4 an art museum. One
possible solution to this problem would be to extend the Ranken
standard to these kinds of facilities and permit a public project to
include whatever commercial space is necessary to make the facility pay its own way. The New York courts, at least, probably
would accept such an extension by relying on the case of Hotel
Dorset Co. v. Trust for CulturalResources. 45 In that case the New
York Court of Appeals upheld a scheme for constructing and operating a new wing for the Museum of Modern Art. The government
had established a cultural trust with condemnation power, the purpose of which was to construct a fifty-story tower adjoining the
museum. The lower six floors of the tower were to be used as a new
wing for the museum, but the remainder of the tower was to be
developed as condominiums. The condominium owners were to
make a tax equivalency payment-the property enjoyed a tax exemption-part of the proceeds of which were to be used to meet
operating and debt service costs on the new wing. If this arrangement could be found by a court to be public enough to support
giving condemnation power and a tax exemption to a cultural
142. See Local Gov't Comm'n of N.C., Official Statement Re: City of Washington,
N.C. Electric System Bonds, Sept. 18, 1981, at 12 (stating that electric system profits expected to be sufficient to retire general obligation bonds); Durham Morning Herald, Feb. 17,
1982, at 12A, col. 5 (advertisement for passage of general obligation airport bonds stating
that airport revenues will be sufficient to retire the bonds).
143. See R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, MumcUn'A BoNDs 39 (1980); L. MOAK, ADMINISTRATION OF LocAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 58-60 (1970).
144. For a descripion of the Yale Center, which appears to be the only museum to
incorporate space for unrelated retail shops, see Dean, A Legacy of Light, AIA J., Mid-May
1978, at 80.
145. 46 N.Y.2d 358, 385 N.E.2d 1284, 413 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1978).
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provide similar benefits
trust, then it probably is public enough14 to
6
when the owner is a local government.
The thinking of the New York courts, however, may be ahead
of other courts in this area of the law.147 Carried to their logical
conclusion, these cases could change the financing base for much of
local government from taxes to leaseholds and could mark a fundamental change in our general notions of how government should be
financed. Furthermore, to extend the Ranken standard to nonrevenue producing facilities distorts the context in which that standard
was designed to operate. In the cases in which the Ranken standard has been used, the purpose of including commercial space in
a public facility was to enable the facility to become self-sufficient.
Given that purpose, the standard obviously serves a functional
role. In the case of commercial space in a public library, art museum, or other tax-supported facility, however, the purpose of including commercial space probably is not to ensure that the facility will be self-sufficient, but that downtown development
somehow will be furthered. For example, the Yale Center mentioned above included shops that were intended to maintain a
sense of neighborhood in the Center's area-"to 1extend
the urban
48
neighborhood of Chapel Street's northeast side.

As suggested above,1 49 a city has a sufficient interest in the
well-being of its downtown to justify some kinds of public action.
The city, for example, certainly should be allowed to construct
public facilities that contribute to, rather than detract from, the
health of the downtown area. Thus, a city might allow shops in a
downtown facility to maintain the scale of the street or to provide
a visual bridge from one commercial street to another. A related
goal might be the city's desire to avoid making a monument out of
the public facility" and to seek instead to make the facility part
146. The New York Court of Appeals did not have to deal with these implications
when it decided Hotel Dorset. The New York court, however, based its decision upon Bush
Terminal, the Manhattan freight terminal case, see supra note 137, thus, the connection
drawn in the text is by no means attenuated.
147. Another related New York case is Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port Auth., 12
N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963), in which the New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the World Trade Center. The basic public purpose
behind the Center was the centralization of New York's world trade function in one place,
which was a concept that the dissent clearly proved to be implausible. In addition, traderelated office leases that were not international in nature were permitted as incidental leases
to provide revenue to support the basic public use.
148. Dean, supra note 144, at 84.
149. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
150. For a discussion of the possible effects of landmark sites, see J. JACOBS, supra
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of its neighborhood and thereby strengthen the neighborhood itself. If one relies upon the Ranken standard and its context as a
model, shops that are included in a public facility to further downtown vitalization should be considered "incidental" only to the extent that their inclusion furthers that specific purpose. Thus, a
government should be allowed to provide commercial space in a
downtown facility only on a very limited basis, and the general rule
that governments should not raise revenues by developing and
leasing commercial property should maintain its viability. For example, if the purpose of placing shop space in a new library is visually to bridge two adjoining commercial streets, that purpose
would permit store fronts only along a single street and only at
street level. 151
C. Lease or Sale of Air Rights Above a Public Facility
Similar to the provision of private space in a public facility is

the lease or sale of the air space above the facility. 152 Most com-

monly, the air space above a downtown parking garage is conveyed
to the developer of a hotel, an office building, or an apartment or
condominium. The developer in turn derives at least two benefits
from such an arrangement. First, because he does not have to
purchase the underlying fee, his land acquisition costs often are
reduced. Second, the public facility frequently provides a direct
benefit to his project. If the facility is a parking area, for example,
note 81, at 385.
151. The Yale Center for British Art, although it is not a government facility, conforms to this suggested standard. The shops were intended to extend the Chapel Street
neighborhood and are located only along that street and only at street level. No shops are
above the ground floor and none is located along the other street side of the Center.
152. Concern occasionally arises about a government's capacity to sell or lease the
space beneath a government facility-usually for parking. Such an arrangement in general
can be treated as a sale or lease of surplus property, and the only legal problems which arise
are that legislative authority for the arrangement must exist and that all required procedures must be followed.
The principal additional problem emerges when the surface facility is a park. Because
of the traditional protected status of land in public parks, see 10 E. MCQU.LLIN, supra note
14, § 28.52-.52b, the courts will closely review conveyances of park sub-surface rights to
ensure that the private development does not unduly interfere with park use. Some interference-from entrances and exits and from ventilation equipment-is unavoidable, but as
long as the interference does not absorb more than a small portion of the park, courts probably will uphold the conveyance. See, e.g., City of San Francisco v. Linares, 16 Cal. 2d 441,
106 P.2d 369 (1940) (6% of the public square set aside for garage entrance and exit). The
principal case denying such a conveyance concerned a proposal that would have taken away
a quarter of the surface of the park. Zachry v. City of San Antonio, 157 Tex. 551, 305
S.W.2d 558 (1957).
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the developer may be saved from having to construct his own parking facilities.
In most cases no special concern should be raised about the
validity of an air rights conveyance. In some instances the conveyance might not even be part of a combined public/private project;
rather, the developer simply may have obtained from the government the air rights over an existing or planned facility. In this situation, therefore, the government merely would be disposing of its
surplus property. 153 In other cases the air rights conveyance might
be just one aspect of the incidental lease or sale of space by the
government in one of its facilities. In Bush Terminal Co. v. City of
New York, 154 for example, the New York Port Authority constructed a freight terminal in midtown Manhattan. Although the
terminal needed only one story of space, the Port Authority constructed a sixteen-story building in which to house the terminal
and leased the upper fifteen stories to private concerns. Because
the rental income from the building leases was necessary to the
financing of the terminal, the court held that the private leases
were incidental to the basic public activity-the terminal-and,
therefore, were valid. The outcome presumably would have been
the same if the Port Authority simply had conveyed the air rights
above the first story, rather than building in the air space above
the terminal and leasing out the resulting facilities. When an air
rights conveyance is a special component of a lease of incidental
space, therefore, courts should analyze it as such to determine its
validity.
Air rights conveyance problems arise when the public facility
would not have been constructed-and, therefore, would not have
created any air rights to convey-absent the addition of the private facility. 155 In these cases the government arguably is acquiring
the land on behalf of the developer-particularly if condemnation
is necessary to assemble the site. Thus, the air rights conveyance
becomes an acquisition to benefit private development, and courts
in such situations should analyze the conveyance according to the
standards developed for these transactions earlier in this Article. 156
153. See Cleveland v. City of Detroit, 322 Mich. 172, 33 N.W.2d 747 (1948).
154. 282 N.Y. 306, 26 N.E.2d 269 (1940).
155. See, e.g., Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
156. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The thesis of this Article has been that public participation in
downtown development projects is permissible under limited circumstances. As the discussion indicates, different forms of public
participation bring into question different constitutional doctrines.
A government's acquisition of land through its eminent domain
power clearly is proper as a method of urban renewal in "slum"
areas. Once local governments try to exercise this power in areas
that simply are underdeveloped, however, the governments' use of
their power becomes more problematic and the constitutionality of
the activity becomes dependent primarily upon the judiciary's acceptance of downtown development itself as a public use. If a local
government acquires land from a willing seller, the industrial
development financing cases offer additional doctrinal support to
legitimize the government's actions. Moreover, the government's
subsequent disposition of the land generally will encounter no constitutional difficulty; if, however, the government gives the land to
a developer, or if it conveys the property to him for nominal monetary consideration, courts clearly will hold the conveyance unconstitutional. Finally, the government constitutionally may sell land
at a written-down price if that price accurately reflects the use
value of the land for downtown development.
This Article also has posited that a local government may locate public facilities within a downtown project and may provide
commercial space to private developers within a public facility as
long as the commercial space is "incidental" to the basic public
nature of the facility. The test of what constitutes incidental will
depend on the government's purpose in providing the commercial
space, which might be either to make the facility self-supporting or
to further downtown development. Finally, if a local government
leases or sells air rights above a public facility, courts must examine this conveyance closely under the analysis developed in this
Article. If the public facility serves a public need that-is independent of the commercial sale or lease of the air space, then the government's disposition of the air rights cannot be attacked. If, however, the public facility is built only because of the private
development that will use the air rights and, therefore, is in effect
dependent upon the private development, the government's acquisition of the land, construction of the facility, and disposition of
the air space must meet the same tests for constitutionality as any
acquisition of land for private development.

